Reinventing Medicare
Managed Care: Improving Choice, Access and Quality

Recommendations of the American Society of Internal Medicine

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Reinventing Medicare Managed Care: Improving Choice, Access and Quality

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Executive Summary

**Issues**

**Giving Patients and Their Physicians the Information Needed To Make Informed Decisions on Choice of Plans**

**Proposals**

The Secretary of Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) should require that a Medicare managed care organization (MCO) provide beneficiaries with information that explains its policies—formatted and written in the most easily understandable manner possible. MCOs also should disclose other information to help beneficiaries to make informed choices, including disenrollment rates; the number and percentage of claims for payment for services that were denied and later reversed upon appeal; participating physician turnover rates; dollars spent on patient care and administrative costs; and the satisfaction of enrolled beneficiaries and of participating physicians with the MCO.

HHS should direct the Secretary to develop a comparative information packet on the competing MCOs that the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) would provide upon request to any Medicare beneficiary considering enrollment in an MCO.

**Assuring Beneficiaries’ Freedom To Choose the Physician Who Is Best Qualified To Treat Them**

Medicare MCOs should meet standards concerning enrollee choice of physician, including a point-of-service rider option.

**Assuring That Beneficiaries—Especially Those with Chronic Conditions and Special Needs—Have Timely and Convenient Access to the Full Range of Needed Physician Services**

Medicare MCOs should be required to develop and implement standards for accessibility to hospital-based services, and primary and specialty care physician services. The processes for coordination of care and control of costs should not create undue burdens for enrollees with special health care needs or chronic conditions.

**Assuring That Beneficiaries Have Immediate Access to Bonafide Urgent and Emergency Care**

Medicare MCOs should consider a prudent layperson’s assessment of a medical condition that requires treatment in an emergency room as one of the factors in determining when it should pay for initial screening and stabilization, if necessary, in an emergency. The determination should be based on what is known by the patient at the time emergency care is sought, rather than what is learned as a result of the emergency room visit. HCFA should require MCOs with pre-authorization requirements for emergency and urgent care to comply with specific time frames for making such authorizations and on appeals of initial denials for urgent care.
Issues

Assuring That MCOs Do Not Inappropriately Deny Payment for Beneficial Medical Services

Proposals

Medicare MCOs should establish utilization review (UR) programs with the involvement of participating physicians, and should release to affected health providers and enrollees the screening criteria, weighting elements and computer algorithms used in reviews, and a description of the method by which these were developed; uniformly apply UR criteria that are based on sound scientific principles and the most recent medical evidence; use licensed, certified or otherwise credentialed health professionals in making review determinations and, subject to safeguards outlined by the Secretary, make available upon request the names and credentials of those conducting UR.

Medicare MCOs should involve affiliated doctors in network management, and set up with participating provider input, provider performance evaluation measures; establish procedures for selection of health professionals based on objective standards of quality developed with suggestions and advice of professional associations, health professionals and providers; provide for review of applicants by committees with appropriate representation of each category and class of provider and written notification to provider applicants of any information indicating that the applying provider fails to meet the standards of the plan, along with an opportunity for the applicant to submit additional or corrected information. Economic profiling should be adjusted by taking into account a physician or health professional's patient characteristics (such as severity of illness) that may lead to unusual utilization of services. The results of such profiling should be made available to plan providers involved.
Assuring That Internal and External Reviews of the Quality of Care Provided by MCOs Are Sufficient for Beneficiaries To Obtain Necessary and Beneficial Care

Medicare MCOs should be required to establish mechanisms to incorporate the recommendations, suggestions and views of enrollees, participating physicians and providers into the medical policies of the plan (such as policies relating to coverage of new technologies, treatments and procedures; quality and credentialing criteria; and medical management procedures); to monitor and evaluate high-volume and high-risk services and the care of acute and chronic conditions; to evaluate the continuity and coordination of care that enrollees receive, and to have mechanisms to detect both underutilization and overutilization of services. HCFA should check the effectiveness of a plan's quality assurance and utilization management processes and should include in that examination a systematic consideration of any peer-review organization (PRO) findings concerning the quality of the plan—using trained clinical evaluators. HCFA should require external review by an independent entity of each MCO's internal quality improvement procedures. In addition, HCFA should provide for private sector accreditation as an alternative to federal review and certification of MCOs.

Assuring That Beneficiaries Have Access to a Fair, Objective and Timely Process for Seeking Reconsiderations and Appeals of Denials for Medical Treatments, or To Have Other Grievances Addressed

Medicare MCOs and HCFA's own contractor for reviewing appeals should be required to meet appeals and grievance criteria that would reduce substantially the length of time from an initial determination to a final review by the independent contractor. Prompt review of emergency and urgent care, or complaints about inadequate access, should be required. Any contractor HCFA uses to review appeals of an MCO's decision to deny payment for otherwise covered services should be required to meet performance standards that are comparable to those required of Medicare Part B fee-for-service carriers.
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<td>Assuring That Physician Incentive Payments Do Not Lead to Conflicts of Interest Between the Beneficiary and the Physician, Possibly Resulting in Inadequate Patient Care</td>
<td>HCFA should require MCOs that have financial incentive arrangements with physicians to provide adequate stop-loss coverage for physicians who are at substantial financial risk for services provided to Medicare and Medicaid enrollees. MCOs that pay physicians on an individual or group capitation basis should adjust their provider capitation payments to reflect the risk selection of the patients assigned to an individual participating provider, using such risk-adjustment methodologies as approved by the Secretary for this purpose. HCFA should improve its interim final rule on physician incentive plans to provide better stop-loss protection.</td>
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<td>Assuring That Medicare Payments to MCOs Do Not Create Incentives for MCOs To Discriminate Against Sicker Patients with More Complex—and Costly—Illnesses</td>
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<td>Assuring That HCFA Adequately Enforces Current and Proposed Standards</td>
<td>Although approaches that emphasize continued quality improvement are preferable to ones that rely on punitive sanctions, HCFA should use its authority to impose sanctions against the MCOs for failure to provide medically necessary services required by a beneficiary, or for other major violations that can adversely affect quality and access. A graduated and increasing level of sanctions should be applied for each violation by a Medicare MCO.</td>
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Reinventing Medicare Managed Care: Improving Choice, Access and Quality

Introduction

The American Society of Internal Medicine (ASIM) believes there is a need for Congress and the administration to make improvements in the standards used to evaluate Medicare managed care organizations (MCOs). The federal government must implement revised standards to assure that beneficiaries are given the information they need to make an informed choice of health plan, that beneficiaries receive reasonable assurances that they will have access to the physicians and services that they need, and that requests for reconsiderations of denied claims are heard in a timely manner. ASIM's conclusions are based on an intensive analysis of the current standards that apply to Medicare MCOs, the concerns expressed by several oversight agencies and advisory bodies about the inadequacy of the current standards, and a review of several legislative and regulatory proposals to improve federal oversight over Medicare MCOs. ASIM represents physicians who specialize in internal medicine—the nation's largest physician specialty and the one that provides medical care to more Medicare beneficiaries than any other.

Both the administration and Congress are in the process of instituting reforms that are likely to further accelerate enrollment in Medicare managed care arrangements. The administration's new Medicare Choices demonstration project will allow beneficiaries in communities that currently do not have substantial enrollment in managed care to join MCOs that offer more flexibility than traditional HMOs and CMPs, such as preferred provider organizations (PPOs), provider-sponsored organizations (PSOs), and point-of-service (POS) plans. Since PPOs, POS plans and many PSOs give patients the option of receiving services outside of a health plan’s network of providers, they offer a wider choice of physicians than conventional staff-model or network HMOs. The expanded freedom of choice provided by such arrangements is likely to attract beneficiaries who otherwise would be unwilling to join a managed care plan. Incentives to expand enrollment in MCOs is a lynchpin of the Medicare reform proposals that the 104th Congress has considered. Should reforms similar to those proposed in the Balanced Budget Acts of 1995 and 1996 ultimately be enacted into law, the transition from Medicare fee-for-service to Medicare managed care will be further accelerated.

With increased enrollment, there is an increased need for the federal government to exercise appropriate oversight over the care provided to Medicare beneficiaries.
who are enrolled in MCOs. Unfortunately, despite some recent efforts to make improvements, the federal government is not doing an adequate job of exercising oversight over the care provided to the more than 3 million beneficiaries who are currently enrolled in the 150-plus HMOs and CMPs that now participate in the program. There is considerable evidence to support the conclusion that despite recent improvements, the existing federal certification standards for Medicare MCOs need improvement, even though a relatively small number of beneficiaries are now enrolled in MCOs. Major improvements will clearly be needed as the number and types of plans—and the number of enrollees—increase rapidly over the next several years.

The Institute of Medicine (IOM) of the National Academy of Sciences issued a report in July 1996 that supports the need for major improvements in the standards applied to Medicare MCOs. The authors of the report observed that:

As major efforts to shift Medicare patients into managed care plans move forward, many experts and patient advocates are concerned whether the necessary information and protections are in place to enable beneficiaries to select an appropriate health plan wisely and to ensure that this group continues to have access to high quality health care. The potentially daunting scope and speed of the transition by elderly Americans into what for most beneficiaries remains uncharted waters makes the need for high-quality, trustworthy information and accountability particularly critical. Only by laying a solid infrastructure in which individuals can make informed purchasing decisions and which competition is based on quality performance can the public confidence needed to move Medicare beneficiaries safely and responsibly into a marketplace for choice and managed care be ensured.

Other recent reports have reached similar conclusions on the need to improve the standards that apply to Medicare MCOs. In August 1995, the General Accounting Office (GAO)—a watchdog arm of Congress—issued a report that concluded the following:

Although the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) has instituted several promising improvements, its process for monitoring and enforcing Medicare HMO performance standards continues to suffer from three significant limitations:

- **Quality assurance reviews are not comprehensive.** Even HMOs with many serious documented quality problems were not found to be out of compliance with requirements by HCFA’s routine monitoring. HCFA routinely reviews the HMO’s descriptions of its quality assurance processes—it does not check to see whether HMOs implement those processes effectively....

- **Enforcement actions are weak.** When HCFA has documented problems in HMOs that have been slow to correct deficiencies, it has been reluctant to use sanctions and other enforcement tools at its disposal. Under HCFA’s enforcement approach, serious improprieties by a few Medicare HMOs—subjecting beneficiaries to abusive sales practices, unduly delaying their appeals, or exhibiting patterns of poor quality care—have taken years to resolve.
The appeals process is slow. Beneficiaries who appeal HMO denials often wait six months or more for resolution. The consequences for beneficiaries may include prolonged uncertainty, high out-of-pocket costs, and having to disenroll from an HMO to obtain services.

GAO also noted that “HCFA's current regulatory approach to ensuring good HMO performance lags behind the latest private sector practices.” As noted later in this report, the GAO reiterated its concerns in a second follow-up report that was issued in April 1996, taking into account recent efforts by HCFA to improve its oversight of Medicare MCOs.

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) surveyed a stratified sample of 4,132 enrollees and disenrollees from 45 Medicare risk HMOs. Although OIG concluded that “generally, beneficiary response indicates Medicare risk HMOs provided adequate service access for most beneficiaries who had joined,” it also found that “compliance with federal enrollment standards for health screening and informing beneficiaries of their appeal rights appeared to be problematic,” “some enrollees experienced noteworthy delays” in receiving timely appointments for primary and specialty care, “disenrollees reported more problems with access to primary and specialty care,” and “overall, HMO beneficiaries seemed relatively healthy; however, disenrollees rated their health lower than enrollees and reported a much greater decline in health status during their HMO stays.”

The Physician Payment Review Commission (PPRC), in its 1995 report to Congress, recommended that HCFA “make performance reports on the managed care plans that contract with the Medicare program available to beneficiaries to inform their choices . . . .” In its 1996 report to Congress, PPRC expanded on its recommendations for holding Medicare MCOs accountable:

- All health plans that serve Medicare beneficiaries should be subject to the same standards to promote quality of care. Specific methods for meeting those standards may differ as appropriate, depending on plan design.

- Medicare restructuring legislation should require all health plans serving Medicare beneficiaries to participate in an audited system of consumer-oriented performance reporting that emphasizes measures of health care quality.

- All health plans that serve Medicare beneficiaries should be required to maintain an internal quality assurance program. Medicare's requirements for these quality assurance programs should be consistent with established private sector requirements, where they exist, and should reflect differences in plan design as appropriate.

- All health plans that serve Medicare beneficiaries should be subject to external quality review by an independent entity approved by the Department of Health and Human Services. Plans' internal quality assurance programs should be subject to periodic external review to verify that they meet established standards.
Consumer protection requirements to foster quality of care should apply to all plans that serve Medicare beneficiaries. Plans should be required to maintain procedures for beneficiary appeals of plan decisions not to provide or pay for a service, for timely resolution of beneficiary and provider grievances, and for notification of beneficiary rights and responsibilities.

PPRC's report does not specify whether the external review should be conducted by Medicare peer review organizations (PROs), private sector accreditation entities such as the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), or some other entity.

The Institute of Medicare report mentioned earlier cites several other studies that support the need for the Health Care Financing Administration and Congress to make major improvements in the federal government's approach to improving choice, access, and quality in Medicare managed care.

**HCFA's Efforts To Improve Quality in Medicare Managed Care**

To its credit, HCFA is beginning to develop better ways to assure adequate quality and access in Medicare MCOs. The agency's Health Care Quality Improvement Program (HCQIP) is intended to emphasize outcomes and improvement in quality of care—borrowing from outcome-based and continuous quality improvement (CQI) models that increasingly are being applied to private sector MCOs. The HCQIP program has, for example, dramatically improved the way the Medicare PROs review care in the fee-for-service setting, de-emphasizing chart-by-chart review that was intended to "single-out poor performers after the fact to one of quality improvement, promoting good practices, and continually identifying opportunities for improvement" [Statement of the American Medical Peer Review Association to the Ways and Means Committee, March 31, 1995].

HCFA also is a participant in the Foundation for Accountability (FAcct). FAcct was founded by large corporate purchasers of health care, with the goal of developing a new generation of quality measures for health plans to provide purchasers and consumers with relevant information for health care decision-making. HCFA's goal is to integrate outcome-based performance measures into its Medicare MCO certification program.

The agency also is a participant in the development of the next generation of the Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS 3.0), a set of performance measures developed by NCQA. Previous versions of HEDIS were intended principally for employers to use in comparing the performance of health plans in the private sector. HEDIS 3.0 "is weaving together the interests and concerns of all three payer populations—commercial, Medicare and Medicaid—to create a comprehensive set of performance measures" [NCQA World Wide Web notice]. The HEDIS 3.0 draft standards were released in July, 1996 for public review and comment.

HCFA is also funding a pilot project to develop a method for assessing the care of Medicare beneficiaries who receive their care from managed care organizations. The Delmarva Foundation for
Medical Care (Delmarva)—the PRO for Maryland and the District of Columbia—together with Harvard University has developed performance measures that are being pilot tested in several states. HCFA intends to use the results of the pilot project to develop and implement performance measures for managed care organizations that contract to provide care to Medicare beneficiaries.

Finally, HCFA officials have stated their desire to make changes in the standards governing appeals and coverage of urgent and emergency room care to address the concerns that have been raised about the current requirements. HCFA also has stepped up its enforcement against plans that fail to meet the current standards, including the imposition of intermediate sanctions on some MCOs.

Further Improvements Still Needed

Despite such efforts, however, HCFA's approach to holding Medicare MCOs accountable for quality and access to services still suffers from significant deficiencies, according to GAO's most recent analysis, published in April 1996. While crediting HCFA for its efforts to improve the Medicare MCO certification program, GAO concluded that HCFA's qualification program for HMOs remains inadequate for the following reasons:

- HCFA does not determine whether HMO quality assurance programs are operating effectively. HCFA's routine compliance monitoring reviews do not go far enough to verify that HMOs monitor and control quality of care as federal standards require. The reviews check only that HMOs have procedures and staff capable of quality assurance and utilization management—not for effective operation of these programs.
- HCFA does not systematically incorporate the results of PRO review of HMOs or use PRO staff expertise in its compliance monitoring.
- HCFA does not routinely collect utilization data that could most directly indicate potential quality problems. In the fee-for-service sector, claims data are available and can be used to detect potential overutilization of services. Although HCFA has the authority to require HMOs to collect such data... no comparable data exist for use in the Medicare HMO qualification program to detect potential underutilization.
- HCFA does not evaluate HMO risk-sharing arrangements with providers. [Note: Since the GAO report was issued, HCFA has issued final rules governing such arrangements. For reasons discussed later in this report, the regulation does not go as far as it should in protecting beneficiaries from financial incentives to underserve patients.]

GAO also found that enforcement processes remain slow when HCFA does find quality problems or other deficiencies at HMOs that do not comply promptly with standards.” Finally, GAO found that “HCFA does not routinely release its site visit reports to the public.”

Although HCFA advised GAO that it intends to have an outside contractor perform annual surveys of a statistically valid sample of Medicare enrollees in every Medicare MCO—using a standard survey and consistent analysis of the information received from beneficiaries—HCFA had not yet begun the contracting process. The intent is for the surveys to include information on member satisfaction, quality of care, and access to ser-
vices. HCFA will use the data to monitor HMOs as well as to translate the resulting data into information that will be meaningful to beneficiaries. GAO concluded, however, that “HCFA's plans and timetable for implementing patient satisfaction measurement information lag behind those of some private sector employers and state agencies because HCFA does not believe it has useful information to give to beneficiaries. We agree that HCFA should proceed with due care . . . however, other responsible purchasers already have proceeded with surveying constituents to determine their feelings about their health care and have published satisfaction data and other performance information to help individuals make purchasing decisions.”

The Institute of Medicine similarly concluded that substantial improvements are needed in Medicare's requirements as they relate to disclosure of information to beneficiaries, development of performance based measures, external oversight of quality, coverage of emergency care, timeliness of appeals, and other elements addressed in this paper. The IOM's study specifically embraced the notion that the federal government has a responsibility to hold all Medicare plans—including managed care arrangements—accountable:

For the purpose of this report, the committee selected to define public accountability as accountability to the public, defining public as beneficiaries in the first instance, but also the larger public as interested parties and taxpayers, and to define government as the elected representatives of the citizenry. Although public accountability may mean different things to different people, most would accept the basic premise that managed care (choice) plans should be held accountable to both Medicare beneficiaries and to the public at large: to Medicare beneficiaries because of the contractual arrangements between managed care plans and their Medicare enrollees and to the general public because it pays . . . for the care that is provided . . . the committee discussed some additional elements of public accountability and determined that these should include the following:

- Requirements for disclosure and the dissemination of useful information,
- The capacity to assess and report whether contracted services are performed responsibly and effectively,
- Requirements as a public program financed by taxpayer dollars to see that the needs of individuals are balanced against the wise use of collective resources,
- A special level of responsibility as the purchaser of health care for elderly beneficiaries, many of whom are vulnerable.

ASIM supports the IOM's fundamental conclusion that the federal government must hold Medicare managed care plans accountable to the public. The recommendations in this paper outline an approach for improving accountability while avoiding excessive regulations and micromanagement that could stifle innovation in the market.
Principles Underlying ASIM’s Recommendations

ASIM’s goal is to identify a reasonable set of standards for MCOs that contract to provide services to Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries. Such standards should be designed to make Medicare-Medicaid MCOs more accountable for their impact on the access to—and quality of—medical care that is provided to enrollees. Internists believe that MCOs must be held more accountable for their impact on care of patients with the more chronic and complex illnesses typically treated by internists and IM subspecialists, since those patients are most at risk of seeing access to—or quality of—care compromised under some managed care arrangements.

The proposed standards are based on the following principles:

1. The federal government should be as concerned about the potential for underprovision of needed services in Medicare MCOs as it is about potential overutilization in the Medicare FFS program. The federal government has extensive rules and procedures to protect FFS beneficiaries from potential overutilization—including prepayment screens, coding edits, medical necessity review, and postpayment review and audits—that may occur because of the incentives in FFS to provide more services to beneficiaries. It does not appear that the federal government has placed much emphasis on assuring that there are reasonable consumer protections against the potential for underutilization—for example, patients being denied access to beneficial tests or to the physicians who are best qualified to treat them—that are present whenever a health plan is placed at financial risk for the services it provides to patients. Medicare should avoid a micromanagement approach to assuring that appropriate care is provided, both in the FFS and managed care settings. But Medicare can and should do more to assure that MCOs have safeguards in place to protect against underutilization—subject to oversight by the federal government and other independent review entities, such as PROs.

2. Although Medicare currently has specific requirements relating to the process and timeliness of appeals and reconsiderations of denied services, improvements can and should be made to improve the timeliness and process of review.

3. Beneficiaries should be provided with accurate, understandable and balanced information to enable them to make an informed choice between FFS and managed care, as well as among the managed care options that are available to them.

4. The quality and access standards that apply to each MCO, as well as the methods of reimbursement to Medicare MCOs, need to be designed to protect patients with more complex and costly illnesses from discriminatory treatment by the MCO.
ASIM intends for its recommendations to be used in the following ways:

1. **HCFA should consider incorporating these recommendations into its HMO qualification program.** HCFA already is considering implementing approaches—such as providing beneficiaries with more information to help them make informed choices—that are similar to those proposed in this paper. The agency is also working on the development of performance- and outcome-based measures for Medicare MCOs. It reportedly also is looking at ways to streamline the appeals process and to clarify its policies on provision of emergency room and urgent care services. ASIM believes, however, that the agency can move more quickly on implementing many of the changes proposed in this paper. It should move faster to incorporate the proposed disclosure and reporting requirements into its qualification program. There are data already available to HCFA, such as disenrollment rates by plan, that can and should be provided now, even as more extensive reporting mechanisms are developed. Further, the specific types of data ASIM believes should be reported to both patients and physicians go considerably beyond HCFA’s current plans on disclosure. Similarly, HCFA can and should make it a higher priority to bring about prompt implementation of changes to improve the review and appeals process, to require external oversight of MCOs’ internal quality improvement procedures, and to clarify policy on emergency and urgent care.

2. **To the extent that HCFA is unwilling or lacks the legal authority to institute the proposed changes, Congress should consider mandating them.**

3. **The managed care industry should begin to institute voluntarily the changes—recommended by ASIM, PPRC, GAO and others—that are within their control, such as disclosing more information to prospective enrollees, modifying precertification requirements and speeding up the time frame for reviewing requests for reconsiderations.** Although clear federal requirements will be needed to assure consistent performance across competing MCOs, there is no reason that MCOs cannot on their own begin to implement many of the changes proposed in this paper.

Medicare should avoid a micromanagement approach to assuring that appropriate care is provided.
Recommendations

Giving Patients and Their Physicians the Information Needed To Make Informed Decisions on Choice of Plans

I. ASIM believes that information described below should be disclosed to enrollees and potential enrollees prior to enrollment, at least once annually thereafter, and at any time that the MCO substantially modifies its established rules or policies. (Note: The current standards applying to Medicare MCOs are in regular type; ASIM's proposed additions and modifications are presented in italics.)

A. Require MCOs to provide beneficiaries with information written and formatted in the most easily understandable manner possible that explains:

1. Written rules and policies regarding benefits;

2. How and where to obtain services from or through the MCO;

3. Restrictions on coverage for services furnished outside the MCO, including the extent to which enrollees may select the providers of their choice (from within or outside the plan's network of providers if applicable), and the restrictions (if any) on payment for services furnished to the enrollees by providers other than those participating in the plan;

4. The obligation of the MCO to assume financial responsibility and to provide reasonable reimbursement for emergency services and urgently needed services;

5. Any services other than emergency or urgently needed services that the HMO or CMP chooses to provide;

6. Premium information;

7. Grievance and appeal procedures including the right to address grievances to the Secretary of HHS or the applicable review entity;

8. Disenrollment rights;

9. Any restrictions that limit coverage to prescription drugs approved by the MCO (i.e., drug formularies);

10. Any prior authorization requirements for inpatient admissions, elective procedures or referrals;

11. Any rules that require beneficiaries to obtain authorization from a primary care physician (PCP) to cover referrals for tests, elective procedures and specialty care; and

12. Any rules that limit access to clinical laboratory tests performed in participating physicians' offices.

B. Require MCOs to inform beneficiaries of their right to be informed about various treatment options including:

1. The right to discuss with their physician the advisability of seeking treatment options that may
not be available through the MCO or for which the MCO will not authorize coverage; and

2. The right to decline treatment.

C. Require MCOs to disclose their disenrollment rates for Medicare enrollees for the previous two years (excluding disenrollment due to death or moving outside of the plan's Medicare service area).

D. Require MCOs to disclose the number and percentage of claims for payment of services for the previous two years that were denied by the plan and appealed to the Secretary of HHS, an administrative law judge, or federal court under the appeals procedures that are available to beneficiaries; and disclose the number and percentage of such denials that were reversed upon appeal.

E. Require MCOs to disclose the number and percentage of participating providers for the prior three years whose contracts with the MCO were not renewed by action of the MCO or the provider.

F. Using a standard reporting format as required by the Secretary, require MCOs to disclose their medical expense ratio. A medical expense ratio represents the proportion of total revenue spent on medical services, as opposed to the proportion spent on administrative expenses, retained or distributed to owners.

G. Require MCOs to disclose any restrictions placed on the information that participating providers are allowed to discuss with or otherwise communicate to beneficiaries.

H. Using a standard reporting format as required by the Secretary, require that the MCO provide a report card on the satisfaction of enrolled beneficiaries and participating physicians with the plan. As a basis for preparing such report cards, require MCOs to use a standard survey instrument (as specified by the Secretary) to survey beneficiaries and their participating physicians at least once annually on their satisfaction with the MCO—including assessments by enrolled beneficiaries and by participating providers of the quality of care provided, and the ease by which beneficiaries can access needed services and obtain care from physicians who are most qualified to treat them.

I. Require MCOs that have physician incentive plans (as defined by current regulations) provide a written disclosure—based on standard definitions and explanations as established by the Secretary of HHS—of the impact that such arrangements can have on patient care, including the financial incentives that are created for providers to provide fewer services to beneficiaries. The recently released physician incentive plan regulations need to be improved by standardizing the information that must be provided to patients, rather than leaving it to the plans to decide on the wording and content of the disclosure statements.
II. Congress should direct the Secretary of HHS to develop a comparative information packet on the competing MCOs. HCFA would provide the packet—upon request—to any Medicare beneficiary who is considering enrolling in an MCO.

The information packet must be written and formatted in the most easily understandable manner possible. At a minimum, the information packet should include: comparative data per plan on rates of disenrollment, dollars spent on patient care and administrative costs, the number of grievances/complaints filed with HCFA, standardized surveys of participating physician and enrollee satisfaction with each plan, any sanctions imposed by HCFA for violations of an MCO's contract with the agency during the prior three years, and the percentage of participating provider contracts with the MCO that are not renewed each year for the prior three years. Mandate that such information packets be available in all localities for which beneficiaries have a choice of MCOs no later than Jan. 1, 1999.

Explanation: The underlying premise behind offering beneficiaries a choice of enrolling in MCOs is that competition between health plans can result in better care at lower cost to the Medicare program and to patients. Competition can be effective, however, only if beneficiaries are given the information needed to assess the merits of remaining in FFS or enrolling in MCOs, and to compare the different Medicare MCOs that are available to them. As the IOM observes:

Without adequate, reliable, comparable, and timely information, it is not possible to exercise informed choice.

ASIM believes that beneficiaries must have a right to know about cost-saving internal policies and financial arrangements used by some MCOs that can restrict their access to certain services. Further, such information must be presented in the most easily understandable manner possible, as was proposed in the FY'96 conference agreement on Medicare budget reconciliation. The conference agreement also included recommendations, similar to those proposed by ASIM, on disclosing information on the extent to which patients may select the providers of their choice from within or outside the plan's provider network and on restrictions on payment for services furnished by providers other than those participating in the plan, and on disenrollment rates for the past two years. The president's FY'97 Medicare Expanded Choice proposal supports the recommendations to require that MCOs inform beneficiaries of their right to be informed about various treatment options and their right to decline treatment. The recommendation that the Secretary prepare comparative report cards on MCOs is consistent with recommendations made by PPRC in its 1995 and 1996 reports to Congress.

Although some managed care organizations may resist more detailed disclosure requirements, disclosure can have a positive impact on reducing disenrollments from health plans. According to the IOM:

One way to curb disenrollments is to focus on providing enrollees with as much information as possible up front so that enrollees understand how the plan works, what their expected out-of-pocket expenses will be, the benefit structure, how out-of-plan care is handled and what constitutes an emergency. The plan's responsibilities and
members' rights need to be fully outlined in terms that are easily understood. Studies indicate that the plans with the lowest rates of rapid disenrollment spend a great deal of time educating potential new enrollees up front.

The IOM agreed with many of the recommendations presented by ASIM in this paper on the types of information that should be divulged to beneficiaries, including:

- Enrollment and disenrollment rates;
- Comparative performance on clinical, structural, and satisfaction benchmarks;
- Access measures, including the percentage of referrals denied or unavailable;
- Physician turnover rates;
- Satisfaction measures (specifying those with chronic conditions) including disenrollment information,
- Appeals and grievance procedures, including the numbers, reasons, and resolutions of grievances and appeals per MCO;
- Access and quality findings from HCFA monitoring surveys;
- Information on how referrals are made, including who makes the referrals and on what basis;
- Appeals and grievance systems; and
- Financial and contractual arrangements between plans and providers that may influence their decisions regarding services in the judgment of the federal government.

**Assuring Beneficiaries’ Freedom To Choose the Physician Who Is Best Qualified To Treat Them**

Medicare MCOs should meet the following standards concerning enrollee choice of physician:

A. Enrollees should be able to select a personal physician from among all participating plan physicians.

B. If a plan limits benefits to items and services furnished only by providers in a network of providers which have entered into a contract with the sponsor, the sponsor must also offer at the time of enrollment a POS rider to cover items and services furnished by health professionals who are not participating providers. A supplemental premium could be charged for such a rider and cost-sharing rules imposed by the MCO for out-of-plan services.

C. For the POS option, the HHS Secretary should establish an actuarially sound schedule of limits on cost sharing for out-of-plan items and services. These cost-sharing limits must be applied uniformly to all POS offerings. Cost-sharing for such items and services for lower-income enrollees should be appropriately lower than limits established by the Secretary for other enrollees and should be set at a level that would not pose an unacceptably large financial burden to obtaining out-of-network services. For purposes of cost-sharing, lower-income enrollees are defined as individuals who have adjusted gross in-
Many Medicare beneficiaries are being exposed to managed care's requirements and regulations for the first time.

Explanation: Medicare regulations currently require health plan contracts to allow each enrolled recipient to choose a health professional in the HMO or PHP "to the extent possible and appropriate." Beginning Jan. 1, 1997, MCOs will be able to offer a POS option to enrollees. However, as managed care assumes a larger role in Medicare, many beneficiaries will be exposed to its requirements and regulations for the first time. Many of these same beneficiaries will have chronic or disabling illnesses that may make them vulnerable to pressures to control costs and utilization that are often linked to managed care. By giving these enrollees an option to go outside a health plan's network of providers, with imposed limits on cost-sharing, beneficiaries who are most likely to be dissatisfied with a plan because of their unfamiliarity with managed care will have an outlet for that dissatisfaction.

Assuring That Beneficiaries—Especially Those with Chronic Conditions and Special Needs—Have Timely and Convenient Access to the Full Range of Needed Physician Services

Medicare MCOs should be required to:

A. Develop and implement standards for accessibility to hospital-based services and to primary and specialty care physician services. These accessibility standards shall ensure that the plan establishes and maintains adequate arrangements with a sufficient number, mix and distribution of health professionals and providers to assure that items and services are available to each enrollee in the service area of the plan; in a variety of sites of service; with reasonable promptness (including reasonable hours of operation and after-hours services); with reasonable proximity to the residence and workplace of enrollees; and in a manner that takes into account the diverse needs of enrollees and that reasonably assures continuity of care.

B. Develop and implement standards to allow for the addition of providers to meet patient needs based on increases in the number of enrollees, changes in the patient-to-provider ratio, changes in medical and health care capabilities, and increased demand for services.
C. Develop and implement standards to ensure that processes for coordination of care and control of costs do not create undue burdens for enrollees with special health care needs or chronic conditions.

**Explanation:** MCOs currently are required to arrange for or provide basic health services for which enrollees have contracted within the HMO service area. Medicare's current standards, however, are not as specific as those required by some private sector accrediting bodies. Given that Medicare patients tend to be older, sicker and have more chronic conditions than non-Medicare patients, it is especially important that Medicare MCOs demonstrate that they have standards of accessibility that are at least as stringent as those required by private sector accrediting bodies. ASIM's recommendations are derived in part from existing private sector standards used to accredit commercial managed care plans (e.g., Utilization Review Accreditation Commission standards 4.0-5.2). By incorporating these standards into the Medicare program, beneficiaries will be assured that their health plans meet the same access standards as those required of plans in the private sector.

The Institute of Medicine also has called for new conditions of participation for Medicare MCOs that would include guarantees of sufficient access to the full range of physician services that beneficiaries may require to treat their medical conditions:

[Medicare choice plans should] have resources, including appropriate mixes of specialists and referral services, to provide benefits throughout the service areas to a reasonable degree defined by the federal government so as not to divide metropolitan areas or counties except when natural barriers or other conditions divide service areas.

## Assuring That Beneficiaries Have Immediate Access to Urgent and Emergency Care

**Medicare MCOs should:**

A. Use a prudent layperson's assessment of what constitutes an emergency condition as one of the factors in determining when it should pay for initial screening and stabilization in the emergency room. The determination should be based on what is known by the patient at the time the emergency care is sought, rather than what is later learned as a result of the emergency department visit. Additional evaluation and treatment services should be provided consequent to a medical professional's screening, so a different standard would apply to coverage of such services.

B. Make timely decisions on requests for preauthorization of emergency and urgent care services. (See recommendations on improving the reconsideration and appeals process for specific, recommended time frames for review of emergency and urgent care.)

**Explanation:** HCFA has only broad requirements that plans make appropriate emergency care available to enrollees. HCFA does not specify how plans should treat requests for emergency services. The Physician Payment Review Commission, in its 1996 report to Congress, recommended use of a "prudent layperson"
standard as one factor in determining coverage of initial screening and stabilization in the emergency room, based on what is known by the patient at the time the emergency care is sought, rather than what is learned as a result of the emergency department visits. Adoption of this standard would prevent circumstances in which patients must evaluate whether their illness is a medical emergency or risk denial of payment for emergency room costs—or find after the fact that symptoms that led them to reasonably conclude that a medical emergency existed were later denied by the MCO because it subsequently determined the condition was not an emergency. For example, a beneficiary with shortness of breath who is concerned that he or she may be having a cardiac emergency should not be penalized if it is later determined that the patient was not at risk of having a heart attack.

Concern about how MCOs handle requests for approval of emergency care was also expressed by the IOM. The IOM recommends that:

...the federal government [should] make available an expedited review and resolution of the process for Medicare choices (by an agency independent of the health plan and the traditional Medicare program) to review emergency situations, such as the following (1) when a situation is life-threatening; (2) when the time involved to review the appeal under the usual process would result in loss of function or a significant worsening of the condition or would render the treatment ineffective; or (3) when advanced directives or end-of-life preferences are involved.

Assuring That MCOs Do Not Inappropriately Deny Payment for Beneficial Medical Services

Medicare MCOs should:

A. Establish utilization review (UR) programs with the involvement of participating physicians and release to affected health providers and enrollees the screening criteria, weighting elements and computer algorithms used in reviews and a description of the method by which these were developed.

B. Uniformly apply UR criteria that are based on sound scientific principles and the most recent medical evidence.

C. Use licensed, certified or otherwise credentialed health professionals in making review determinations and, subject to safeguards outlined by the Secretary, make available upon request the names and credentials of those conducting UR.

D. Be explicitly prohibited from compensating individuals conducting UR based on numbers of denials.

E. Treat favorable preauthorization reviews as final for payment purposes unless the determination was based on fraudulent information supplied by the person requesting the determination.
F. Provide timely access to review personnel and, if such personnel are unavailable, waive any preauthorization that would be otherwise required.

**Explanation:** Medicare is a public program and the development and operation of review criteria and policies should be subject to public scrutiny. Furthermore, beneficiaries have a right to expect that their care is being judged on sound medical bases and not merely on cost considerations. Under the FFS side of Medicare, carrier utilization screens and criteria are usually available for review by physicians and consumers. Carriers are also required to solicit comments from state medical societies and specialty societies about proposed changes relating to the review of the medical necessity of covered services under Medicare Part B. They are also required to consult with state carrier advisory committees that include representatives of physicians and other Medicare providers.

Unfortunately, no such requirements exist for Medicare MCOs. ASIM believes that it is essential that participating plan physicians be involved in examining the utilization review guidelines and policies of Medicare MCOs to determine if medical necessity determinations are being made appropriately. If MCOs are able to keep secret the criteria by which they make coverage decisions, there is an increased potential for legitimate medical care to be denied arbitrarily and incorrectly.

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**Assuring That the Methods Used by MCOs To Assess Physician Performance Are Designed and Implemented in a Manner That Will Not Compromise Access and Quality**

**Medicare MCOs should:**

A. Involve affiliated doctors in network management, and set up—with participating provider input—provider performance evaluation measures.

B. Establish procedures for selection of health professionals based on objective standards of quality that would take into consideration suggestions by professional associations, health professionals and providers.

C. Provide for review of applicants by committees with appropriate provider representation, and written notification to provider applicants of any information indicating that the applying provider fails to meet the standards of the plan, along with an opportunity for the applicant to submit additional or corrected information.

D. Use objective criteria when taking into account economic considerations in the selection process, and make such criteria available to those professionals applying to participate.

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**Beneficiaries have a right to expect that their care is being judged on sound medical bases and not merely on cost considerations.**
E. Adjust economic profiling by taking into account a physician's or health professional's patient characteristics (such as severity of illness) that may lead to unusual utilization of services, and make the results of such profiling available to plan providers involved.

F. Provide potential participating providers with the plan's contracting standards and criteria.

G. Involve participating physicians in developing written policies for disciplinary action and sanctions.

H. Unless the physician poses an imminent harm to enrollees, provide:

1. A 90-day notice of a determination to terminate a physician contract "for cause;"

2. An opportunity to review and discuss all of the information on which the determination is based;

3. An opportunity to submit supplemental and corrected information; and

4. An opportunity to enter into a corrective action plan.

I. Not include in its contracts with participating physicians a provision permitting the MCO to terminate a contract "without cause."

**Explanation:** HCFA regulations do not appear to address specifically requirements concerning credentialing of providers or measurement of provider performance. However, indirect references to MCOs providing for review of the processes in which health services are delivered, and collection of data regarding organizational performance and patient results would imply the necessity for the MCOs to engage in credentialing and provider performance measurement activities. Given requirements of private sector accreditation programs concerning credentialing of plan providers, such as those devised by the Utilization Review Accreditation Commission, ASIM believes that similar standards should be incorporated into the Medicare program and recommends that participating physicians should be consulted on credentialing standards and informed of their own performance relative to plan standards. In addition, participating physicians should be given a chance to improve performance before adverse actions are taken—except in cases of imminent harm to patients. Such standards also would ensure that patients who may have longstanding relationships with a particular physician are not suddenly deprived of that physician's services due to an adverse action by an MCO. This would be especially important for frail or chronically ill elderly patients whose conditions require the knowledge and historical experience of their physician to receive optimum care.

ASIM's recommendations would not limit the ability of MCOs to contract selectively with physicians, to require appropriate credentials, or to make decisions on selection and de-selection based on performance criteria, including criteria relating to quality, patient satisfaction, and cost-effectiveness. The recommendations would put the appropriate emphasis on collaborating with physicians to improve quality, rather than using a secretive and punitive approach to assessing physician performance. Without some assurance that MCOs will base their assessments on objective criteria that has credibility
to physicians, and that individual physicians' performance profiles will take into account differences in the severity of illness of the patients being treated, there is a grave risk that some MCOs will arbitrarily exclude highly qualified physicians from participation in the plan—especially physicians who have a sicker patient population.

Assuring That Internal and External Reviews of the Quality of Care Provided By MCOs Are Sufficient for Beneficiaries To Obtain Necessary And Beneficial Care

I. Medicare MCOs should be required to:

A. Establish mechanisms to incorporate the recommendations, suggestions and views of enrollees and participating physicians and providers that improve quality of care into:

1. Medical policies of the plan (such as policies relating to coverage of new technologies, treatments and procedures);

2. Quality and credentialing criteria of the plan; and

3. Medical management procedures of the plan.

B. Monitor and evaluate high-volume and high-risk services and the care of acute and chronic conditions.

C. Evaluate the continuity and coordination of care that enrollees receive.

D. Have mechanisms to detect both underutilization and overutilization of services.

E. Use systematic data collection of performance and patient results, provide interpretation of these data to its practitioners, and make needed changes.

F. Make available information on quality and outcomes measures to facilitate beneficiary comparison and choice of health care options (in such form and on such quality and outcomes measures as the Secretary determines to be appropriate).

Explanation: HCFA currently requires health plans to have “an ongoing quality assurance program” that stresses health outcomes to the extent consistent with the state of the art and that provides for review by physicians and other health professionals of the process followed in the provision of health services. MCOs also should have written procedures for taking appropriate remedial action whenever—as determined under the quality assurance program—inappropriate or substandard services have been provided, or services that ought to have been furnished have not been provided. However, further elaboration of the content of health plan quality assurance programs, as outlined in last year’s Balanced Budget Act and in H.R.2400, (the Family Health Care Fairness Act), would ensure that managed care plans take all steps necessary to assure a high level of quality in their delivery of health care services.
II. HCFA should:

A. Require MCOs to regularly report patterns of utilization of services, availability of such services and other information to track utilization, access and satisfaction of enrollees.

B. As recommended earlier, routinely publish comparative data collected on HMOs such as complaint rates, disenrollment rates, rates of outcomes and appeals as well as the results of its investigations or any findings of noncompliance by HMOs.

C. Check the effectiveness of a plan’s quality assurance and utilization management processes and, using trained clinical evaluators, include in that examination a systematic consideration of any PRO findings concerning the quality of the plan.

D. Impose an appropriate level of sanctions when a significant quality deficiency is detected—until such deficiencies are rectified—such as freezing enrollment in the plan by stopping payment for new Medicare enrollees. (See detailed discussion of sanctions under ASIM’s recommendations for adequate enforcement.)

E. Provide for private sector accreditation as an alternative to federal review and certification of MCOs, provided that a deemed accrediting body’s standards are equal to or stronger than the standards outlined for MCOs by HCFA.

F. Provide for external monitoring—by an independent, publicly-accountable group—of the effectiveness of the MCO’s internal quality improvement processes, emphasizing collaborative efforts to improve quality rather than micromanagement.

Explanation: The GAO report issued last August on the degree of quality oversight the federal government conducts over MCOs found serious gaps in the level of attention HCFA gives to health plan deficiencies. Although HCFA may check to see if a health plan has quality management processes in place, there is little comprehensive effort made by HCFA to ensure that those processes are effective in maintaining quality of care. GAO also discovered that PRO findings of poor quality or questionable practices on the part of a health plan often are not shared or acknowledged when HCFA evaluates a health plan. As a result, HCFA has approved contract renewals with health plans that have been cited by PROs for failure to comply with certain quality standards.
Following the GAO report, PPRC and the Prospective Payment Advisory Commission issued a report in October 1995 urging the creation of a process to monitor trends in access over time, and identify access problems at various levels of a managed care system. Data for such a monitoring process would include enrollment and disenrollment patterns, including rates of early disenrollment. Such data would have to be compared to FFS claims data for time periods following disenrollment to determine if a patient’s anticipated needs for services led to the enrollment patterns. Other useful data include beneficiary appeals to HCFA for reconsideration of plan coverage decisions.

The IOM recommends that all Medicare plans be "subjected to comparable state-of-the-art standards and monitoring for quality . . . When the standards and processes of private credentialing agencies meet or exceed those of the federal government, private organizations should be used to reduce duplication in the market.

As noted previously, in its 1996 report to Congress, the PPRC explicitly called for external monitoring of MCO’s internal quality assurance methods:

All health plans that serve Medicare beneficiaries should be subject to external quality review by an independent entity approved by the Department of Health and Human Services. Plans' internal quality assurance programs should be subject to periodic external review to verify that they meet established standards.

I. Medicare MCOs should be required to meet the following appeals and grievance criteria:

A. As required under existing standards, the MCO should ensure that all enrollees receive written information about the appeals and grievance procedures at the time of enrollment. Given the findings by GAO and OIG that some MCOs have been violating this requirement without being sanctioned by HCFA, HCFA should strictly enforce this requirement and impose sanctions on plans that are not in compliance.

B. The MCO should review an adverse preauthorization determination—upon request of the enrollee, enrollee’s family or enrollee’s physician—within specified time frames that would allow for a rapid determination of denials for urgent and emergency care. HCFA’s
current standards do not include any specific requirements for timely review of emergency and urgent care. ASIM proposes the following time frames:

1. For urgent care services, within one hour after the time of the request for such review; and

2. For services other than emergency and urgent care, within 24 hours after the time of a request for such review.

C. The MCO should review an initial determination on payment of claims within 45 days after the date of a request for such review by the enrollee, enrollee's family or recipient of payment (provider), instead of the 60 days allowed under the existing standards.

D. The MCO should review a grievance regarding inadequate access to any physician specialist by an enrollee, the enrollee's family, or the enrollee's physician, within five business days. The current standards do not include any specific requirements on timely reviews of complaints concerning inadequate access.

E. The MCO should inform the parties involved with the complaint of its decision in writing. The notice should state the specific reasons for the determination and inform the enrollee and enrollee's physician of his/her right to reconsideration.

F. The MCO preauthorization/claims payment reviewer described in this section should be of the same or similar medical specialty as the provider of the service in question.

G. A request for a second reconsideration should be made in writing by the enrollee, enrollee's family or enrollee's physician and filed with the MCO or the Social Security Administration office within 60 days of the organization determination. The enrollee should request an extension if "good cause" is shown. The MCO should make a second reconsideration within 30 days, instead of the 60 days now allowed, and for access complaints, within five days. If the MCO does not reconsider in the beneficiaries favor, it should prepare a written explanation for all parties involved with the dispute and send the entire case to HCFA for a determination.

H. The MCO should be granted an extension from the above time requirements only if the appropriate providers have not forwarded them patient records for review.

I. If the MCO does not act within the prescribed time period, the case should be automatically decided in favor of the enrollee. Currently, beneficiaries are still subjected to the MCO's original denial of their request for payment of medical services, even when the MCO has failed to comply within the time frames for review in the existing standards.
II. When a case is turned over to HCFA (or its contractor) for a reconsidered determination, HCFA should:

A. As required under current regulations, notify the enrollee, the enrollee’s family, the enrollee’s physician and the MCO of:
   1. The reasons for the reconsidered determination;
   2. The enrollee and enrollee’s physician’s right to a hearing if the amount in controversy is $100 or more; and
   3. The procedure that the enrollee or enrollee’s physician must follow to obtain a hearing.

B. Make a reconsidered determination within 30 days for denials of covered services, as currently required, and within five days for access complaints.

C. As required under existing standards, inform the parties involved with the complaint of its decision in writing. The notice should state the specific reasons for the determination and inform the enrollee of his/her right to a hearing for reconsideration.

D. Establish that the reconsidered determination is final and binding unless a request for a hearing is filed within 60 days of the date of the notice of reconsidered determination by the enrollee, the enrollee’s family or the enrollee’s physician.

E. Decide the case in favor of the enrollee if HCFA or its contractor does not act within the prescribed time period.

III. Medicare should maintain its current standard requiring PROs to immediately review disputes between the MCO and the patient over the length of inpatient stays (stated below):

A. A Medicare enrollee, enrollee’s family or enrollee’s physician who disagrees with a determination made by the MCO that inpatient care is no longer necessary may request immediate PRO review of the determination.

B. The enrollee may stay in the hospital until the PRO makes a determination.

C. The PRO must make a determination and notify the enrollee, the enrollee’s physician, the hospital and the MCO by the close of business the first working day after it receives the information from the parties involved necessary to make a determination.

IV. Any contractor used by HCFA to review appeals of an MCO’s decision to deny payment for otherwise covered services and to review beneficiary grievances should be required to meet performance standards that are comparable to those required of Medicare Part B FFS carriers, including:

A. The contractor should be required to establish state or regional advisory committees of practicing physicians that reflect various medical specialties, practice settings and geographic areas. The advisory committees should:
   1. Review the contractor’s perfor-
mance on reviewing and adjudicating claims disputes;

2. Review newly proposed Medicare policies and policy changes as required by HCFA;

3. Address generic managed care problems raised by HCFA, the contractor, PROs, carriers, MCOs, physicians or beneficiaries. However, the committee will not involve itself with individual physician disputes with an MCO or the contractor;

4. Meet with the contractor on a quarterly basis; and

5. Make quarterly, formal reports to local and state medical associations and specialty societies.

The contractor should provide for timely notification and adequate opportunity for review by state medical societies and specialty societies of changes in criteria, protocols or other standards used by the contractor in making determinations about disputed claims.

The contractor should disclose to physicians and beneficiaries, upon request, all coding edits, medical necessity criteria, algorithms and practice guidelines used to review denials by MCOs.

**Explanation:** According to GAO, PPRC, and the IOM, the current appeals process acts too slowly. MCOs are given up to 60 days to make their initial determination. The internal MCO review process often can take up to six months to complete. Cases that require HCFA review can take even longer than six months—sometimes up to 270 days. Further, GAO found that MCOs and HCFA's own contractor often failed to meet the current deadlines for review and reconsideration of denied claims, but HCFA has been unwilling to take action against MCOs or the contractor for failing to process reviews and reconsideration in a timely manner. In the meantime, beneficiaries are the ones hurt by the failure to get a timely answer to their request that payment be authorized for medical services that they and their physicians believe to be appropriate.

The IOM found that:

The current Medicare appeals process has been shown to be slow and not adequately advertised by HCFA or health plans. Furthermore, the current appeals process is tailored more to reviewing whether a service should be reimbursed by Medicare or a health plan and less on the important issue of whether a needed service was denied. In a competitive environment, to attain better risk selection, health plans have the incentive to encourage healthier people to enroll in the plan and to discourage from enrollment those who need more services. This could prompt plans to be less responsive to the grievances of sicker Medicare enrollees.

To address these problems, the IOM “recommends that the existing appeals process by strengthened, streamlined, and better publicized.”

ASIM recommends shortening the time delays involved in the appeals process and better oversight by HCFA to ensure that beneficiaries are not harmed when MCOs or HCFA's contractors fail to process appeals by the required deadlines. ASIM's recommendations would speed up the review process in the following ways: for all
requests (except for access complaints), the time frame for initial review would be reduced from 60 days to 45 days, and the time frame for reconsideration by the MCO would be cut in half, from 60 to 30 days. This could reduce the entire duration from initial determination to independent review of the determination by 45 days. For complaints about inadequate access, the duration of time from the initial complaint being filed to review by the independent contractor would be reduced to a maximum of 15 days. ASIM’s recommendations for prompt review of urgent and emergency care would ensure that beneficiaries are not put in the position of having to forgo such care—or risk incurring extensive out-of-pocket costs—because of delays in getting authorization for such care.

The current regulations regarding immediate PRO review of inpatient stays are appropriate and should be maintained to protect beneficiaries from being discharged from the hospital prior to the time that their medical condition warrants.

HCFA or its contractor should establish regional committees of practicing physicians to advise them on Medicare policy changes and processing of claims disputes following the model established in Medicare FFS payment system, called Carrier Advisory Committees (CACs). HCFA or its contractor also must disclose the methods used to make coverage decisions. These standards are necessary to ensure that decisions made regarding coverage for Medicare beneficiaries are not made with “black box” technology. Medicare beneficiaries have the right to know why decisions regarding their medical care are made.

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**Assuring That Physician Incentive Payments Do Not Lead to Conflicts of Interest Between the Beneficiary and the Physician, Possibly Resulting in Inadequate Patient Care**

HCFA should require:

A. MCOs that have financial incentive arrangements with physicians to provide adequate stop-loss coverage for physicians who are at substantial financial risk for services provided to Medicare and Medicaid enrollees.

HCFA’s interim final rule on physician incentive plans should be improved by:

1. Reviewing the definition of “risk threshold.” A 25 percent risk threshold may be too high for physicians in solo or small group practice. HCFA should consider developing a graduated risk threshold based upon the size of the physician group or based upon the number of patients in the physician’s or physician group’s patient panel. Using a graduated risk threshold that is lower on smaller patient panels—for example, 10 percent on a solo physician or patient panels of less than 100 patients—will provide greater protection for enrollees than a 25 percent risk threshold. For larger physician groups and larger patient panels, a 25 percent risk threshold is more appropriate.
2. Broadening the regulatory requirement for stop-loss coverage. The initial $10,000 stop-loss limit for patient panels less than 1,000 patients is too high to protect a solo practice or small group of physicians and their patients from unusually high medical expenses. Similarly, the higher stop-loss limits for patient panel sizes greater than 1,000 patients are too high to adequately protect physicians and their patients from random risk of unusually high medical expenses.

3. Increasing the 90 percent protection above the stop-loss limit to 100 percent, 90 percent stop-loss protection is not an adequate safeguard for patients.

B. MCOs to comply with the final rule without any further delay, instead of postponing implementation until 1997.

C. MCOs that pay physicians on an individual or group capitation basis to adjust their provider capitation payments to reflect the risk selection of the patients assigned to an individual participating provider, using risk adjustment methodologies as approved by the Secretary for this purpose.

Explanation: Many Medicare MCOs have financial arrangements with physicians that can result in the physician being rewarded if he or she provides fewer services to beneficiaries. This can create a potential conflict of interest between the physicians’ financial interest in providing fewer services and the beneficiary’s interest in knowing that the physician will always provide all of the services that potentially can benefit the patient. Congress recognized this problem when it enacted legislation in 1990 that requires HCFA to develop rules governing physician incentive arrangements. In March 1996, HCFA published final rules on physician incentive arrangements. Unfortunately, HCFA decided to postpone implementation until 1997 so that the stop-loss requirements would go into effect on the same date as the annual renewals of MCO contracts. Although some press reports suggested that this decision was in response to industry pressure to weaken the consumer protections in the regulations, HCFA officials have indicated that they do not plan to make any substantive changes in the regulation’s requirements.
rule does not set the stop-loss threshold at a level low enough to adequately protect patients who are treated by solo practitioners and physicians in the small group setting.

Financial arrangements with physicians that could compromise care was one of the principal concerns of the IOM committee. The IOM report states:

The committee is concerned about the increasing restrictions on physicians (and the potential conflict of interest of physicians) when they act in their professional roles as advocates for their patients and carry out their contractual responsibilities and receive economic incentives as health plan providers. The committee favors the abolition of payment incentives or other practices that may motivate providers to evade their ethical responsibility to patients to provide complete information to their patients about their illness, treatment options, and plan coverages. So-called anticriticism clauses or gag rules should be prohibited as a condition of participation.

ASIM agrees with the IOM's view that gag clauses and other restrictions on written and oral communications to patients—including prohibitions on physicians' discussing with patients concerns about the impact of an MCO's financial arrangements, referral restrictions, or utilization review policies on the patients ability to access needed services—should be strictly prohibited. ASIM does not favor a complete ban on all arrangements that place physicians at financial risk; rather, we support regulating such arrangements—by requiring full disclosure to patients, by severity-adjusting capitation payments, and by providing stop-loss coverage—to minimize any potential conflict between the physician's and MCO's economic interests and the patient's interest in getting the best care possible.

**Assuring That Medicare Payments to MCOs Do Not Create Incentives for MCOs To Discriminate Against Sicker Patients with More Complex—and Costly—Illnesses**

The HHS Secretary should be required to:

A. Develop a methodology for adjusting Medicare and Medicaid capitation payments to MCOs to reflect risk selection, paying less to plans attracting favorable selection and more to plans with adverse selection. In developing the methodology, the Secretary shall consider factors such as prior utilization and current health status of beneficiaries.


C. Unless Congress acts to block the proposed methodology, implement the severity adjustments no later than Jan. 1, 1999.

**Explanation:** In its 1995 and 1996 reports to Congress, PPRC has stated the importance of adjusting payments to Medicare MCOs to take into account the severity of illness of beneficiaries enrolled in the plans. The current adjusted-aver-
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HCFA should increase sanctions on MCOs based on the frequency of a problem.

Age per capita cost (AAPCC) methodology adjusts payments based on age, sex and dual Medicare-Medicaid eligibility. Such adjustments do not accurately predict how much medical care will be needed by beneficiaries with more complex and severe—and typically more costly—illnesses. Consequently, plans that have a larger proportion of sicker patients are penalized, while those with healthier patients are rewarded. This acts as a strong incentive for plans to avoid enrolling sicker beneficiaries. Despite the recognition by PPRC and HCFA that better severity—or risk adjustment—methodologies are needed, there is concern that none of the current risk-selection methodologies that have been developed by health services researchers fully predict variations between patients in their future use of health care resources. ASIM believes, however, that there are several methodologies that are more predictive of resource consumption than the current AAPCC methodology. Such risk adjustment methodologies can be implemented even as HCFA continues its research into improved adjustors. ASIM's recommendations would assure that development of improved risk adjustors is not delayed because they are less than perfect.

Assuring That HCFA Adequately Enforces Current and Proposed Standards

A. HCFA should be more willing to exercise its existing statutory authority to impose sanctions uniformly against MCOs for contractual violations that can substantially impair beneficiaries access to quality medical care. HCFA should specifically use its existing authority to apply graduated levels of sanctions that would impose increasingly-higher levels of sanctions on repeat violators. The types of violations that should result in imposition of sanctions include:

1. Failure to provide medically necessary services required by a beneficiary;
2. Requiring enrollees to pay excess premiums;
3. Inappropriately expelling or excluding a beneficiary from participation;
4. Denying or discouraging enrollment;
5. Falsifying information;
6. Not promptly paying claims; and
7. Inappropriately terminating participating physicians.

Explanation: In 1988, 1991 and 1995, GAO reported that HCFA was not using its enforcement authority to impose sanctions or monetary penalties on MCOs that fail to meet federal standards. ASIM recommends that HCFA increase sanctions based on the frequency of a problem. Currently, Medicare MCOs can take years to correct their problems. GAO suggests that HCFA begin using its sanction authority to increase the rate of compliance on the part of Medicare MCOs.
Conclusion

ASIM challenges Congress, HCFA and the Medicare managed care industry to adopt the standards as proposed in this paper to protect beneficiaries who choose to enroll in MCOs. ASIM's recommendations are not "anti-managed care;" instead, they attempt to define a reasonable set of consumer protections that good managed care plans should have no difficulty in meeting, without undermining their ability to provide cost-effective medical care. Indeed, ASIM is a strong proponent of reforming Medicare to give beneficiaries a wider choice of health plans, including managed care plans and FFS approaches. Expanded choice also requires, however, greater accountability. MCOs must be held accountable for the quality of—and access to—care they provide to beneficiaries, just as the federal government holds FFS providers accountable for the quality, cost, and access to care they provide.

The need for more disclosure, an improved appeals and grievance process, clearer guidelines on emergency care, improved protections against arbitrary denials of services and "deselection" of qualified physicians, more external oversight of MCOs' internal quality improvement processes, improved methods to adjust capitation payments by severity, and better enforcement of existing standards is well-supported in the research literature. Throughout this paper, ASIM has cited references from the Physician Payment Review Commission, General Accounting Office, Prospective Payment Assessment Commission, and the Institute of Medicine's Committee on Choice and Managed Care that support the general findings and recommendations in this paper, as well as many of the specific recommendations made by ASIM. Private sector accreditation standards, as well as several of the legislative and regulatory initiatives mentioned in this paper, also support the need for improved ways to hold Medicare MCOs accountable to the public.

It should no longer be debatable that more needs to be done to hold Medicare MCOs publicly accountable for their impact on quality and access. Although continued debate on specific approaches to improving accountability are likely, it is not acceptable for Congress, HCFA, or the managed care industry to ignore the need for improvements or to adopt a "go slow" approach to making improvements. ASIM's recommendations present a blueprint for needed reforms, and we challenge the managed care industry and policy makers to join with us in bringing about the improvements outlined in this document.
Endnotes

1. The Clinton administration's FY'97 Budget Proposal.


5. HHS. "HCFA Announces 25 Managed Care Plans As Candidates to Participate in Medicare Choices Demonstration Project," HHS News, April 15, 1996.


